This appendix provides additional background information and robustness tests to probe the quality of our data and results. The appendix is organized into five sections.
victims. The following are considered members of the Armed Forces: members of the Army, Navy, Air Force and National Police; officials of national government entities such as DAS, CTI, the Fiscalía (Attorney General), as well as other officials who are linked to the government.
Capture: The apprehension of a person to deprive him of liberty, whether he was caught in the act or through an arrest warrant. Explosive Ordinance Disposal: The controlled neutralization and/or deactivation of explosive devices conducted by members of the security forces and other public servants. Raids (dismantling of camps): The planned efforts by members of the security forces and other public servants to destroy and dismantle a camp used to house members of illegal armed groups. Also includes the planned effort by members of the security forces and other public servants, to destroy and/or dismantle facilities, infrastructure and equipment used for illegal purposes (destruction of other illegal infrastructure). Destruction of laboratories: The planned efforts by members of the security forces and other public servants to destroy facilities and inputs used to process illicit drugs. Seizure: The planned efforts by members of the security forces and other public servants to legally confiscate material used illegally, for illegal purposes, or acquired illegally. These include weapons, fuel, communications equipment, explosives, war material, narcotics and precursors, propaganda, among others. Rescue and Liberation by Force: Action through which a kidnapper is forced to free the victim by military pressure exerted by members of security forces and other public servants. Also offensive action through which members of the security forces and other public servants secure the release of a kidnapped/abducted victim.
Data Collection and Reporting Processes
The process of how data on conflict incidents are collected by the Colombian Armed Forces, from the unit on the ground up to the General Command, is detailed in the following document:
"Procesos de Información Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares" (Information Processes of the General Command of the Armed Forces), Colombian Ministry of Defense, Office of Strategy and Planning, Sectoral studies group.
The document describes in detail the process of how data on conflict incidents are collected by the Colombian Armed Forces, from the unit on the ground all the way up to the General Command. There is substantial overlap in these processes among the various branches of the armed forces, although there are also some slight variations in reporting for groups such as mobile units (e.g., naval vessels and aircraft). As an example of these processes, below we have outlined the process of the Army, which consists of no fewer than three levels of review.
1. Tactical unit sends radio report of incidents to the Brigade. 2. Brigade reviews information for accuracy and sends information to the Division (either electronically or by radio), which verifies and refines information on a daily basis for completeness.
3. The division enters the information into the Information System of the Army Command (SICOE) and a paper report is sent to the General Command of the Armed Forces, ensuring there are no duplicates of reports.
4. Officers at the Central Command review information for accuracy and combine reports from different branches of the armed forces. 5. Data is then given to the civilian officials in the Sectoral Studies unit of the Ministry of Defense. In order to help confirm reporting procedures and potential sources of bias in reporting, we conducted interviews with top government officials in the Ministry of Defense as well as with retired military field intelligence (and other) officers who were on active duty during the 1990s through the early 2000s. The officers ranged in rank from Lieutenants up to the mid-level officer rank of Captain. Two were intelligence officers and one was the liaison between his battalion and brigade. Among these officers, tours of duty were served in 11 of Colombias 32 departments, including Arauca and other highly conflictive zones that had been INCORA colonization zones.
Statements from these interviews closely confirm the process of reporting conflict events displayed in Figure 1 . As one officer noted, "The communication centers of the military units (Battalions, Brigades, Divisions, and the General Command) function 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The patrol reports the new incident and it is the commander of the Battalion who decides which information to provide to higher-level commanders." As an example of this process, a battalion in the high conflict zone of the southern part of the department of Santander recorded and reported a broad variety of incidents in 1992, including a case when guerrillas attacked officers on guard duty at the base. As one of the officers noted, it was important to report information to unit commanders "for strategic use in operations against the enemy." He also thought that the process of reporting incidents was "basically the same over time." In the manuscript, of course, we include as a precaution year fixed effects in the models to account for possible secular changes in reporting over time.
Most importantly for understanding possible data biases, these interviews suggest that while there may be opportunities for manipulation of information, these tend to be rare and are often detected and punished severely. For instance, while one officer thought it would likely be more difficult to manipulate reports of some kinds of events than others, with "massive kidnappings or attacks on populations" being relatively difficult to manipulate, he also noted that, "Underreporting adverse events could lead to an officer's retirement from active service." A second officer corroborated this, noting that the few cases of attempted manipulation he knew of triggered punishments and that subsequent actions were taken to limit such actions in the future: "Misinformation was later detected and punished with strong disciplinary sanctions. As a result of this, the use of technology increased to process information at all levels of the Command to avoid false information at all costs and legitimize the military to the Colombian people." He noted that commanders at every level are cautious about reporting information that is not true or verified since it could provide cause for criticism from the media or the "enemy."
In sum, while these interviews only represent a small sample of operating officers, they suggest there are considerable efforts to control attempts at manipulation of information and do not give reason to believe that any manipulation that may occur is systematically correlated with levels of land reform.
Data on Armed Group Actions from Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP)
The definitions of armed group actions as coded by CINEP correspond with those used by the Colombian government. The CINEP conflict data is based on events published in 20 national and regional press sources. The national newspapers include El Tiempo, El Espectador, La República, El Nuevo Siglo, Voz (weekly). 2 Estimating Guerrilla Activities
Multiple Systems Estimation
One technique for estimating the true values of a phenomenon that possibly suffers from hidden cases and misreporting is multiple systems estimation (MSE; see e.g. Lum et al. 2010) . For multiple systems estimation to be implemented most rigorously, it ideally requires at least three independent data sources of guerrilla activity disaggregated into individual events. Unfortunately, events-level data for the OVP (Government) and CINEP variables are not available with complete coverage, and there has been no third independent collection of guerrilla activity that spans this time period with full country coverage. We cannot therefore conduct a viable MSE to approximate the true severity of potential reporting biases. It is unlikely that events-level data from multiple independent sources could be collected at the national level in this case due to data availability issues. An alternative approach of aggregating many series of local-level data collection efforts would likely suffer substantial missing coverage of certain areas. Short of using MSE, we take several additional steps to probe the quality of our data, the nature and degree of bias that would be problematic for our inferences, and the sensitivity of the results to different assumptions about possible reporting bias.
Robustness to Using More "Visible" Guerrilla Activities
Since some kinds of guerrilla activities are more likely to be susceptible to bias or manipulation than others, we conduct several additional robustness tests that separate out these kinds of events. Guerrilla activities fall into a series of different categories (see Section 1). Some of these categories capture events that, unlike events such as human disappearances, are more publicly visible and are therefore less likely subject to the same degrees of misreporting and bias than certain other guerrilla actions. In other words, we are more certain to have close to the complete universe of events across units and time and to be comparing "apples to apples." We here separate out these activities from other less visible activities and re-run the empirical analyses on these subsets of the data. We find similar results.
The distribution of the component attacks that comprise our aggregated measure of guerrilla activity is presented in Figure 2 to show how the 13,629 total actions break down by type. We use these categories of actions to consider two different additional ways of constructing our key dependent variable of guerrilla actions. The use of these two series aims to limit the types of actions included to those where there should be reason to believe they are less susceptible to underreporting due to fear or manipulation and private information. We construct both a "most visible" and a less restrictive "likely visible" categorization of these more "publicly visible" events. Event Category, 1988 -2000 In comparison with the complete series of guerrilla actions, these new series omit more "private" event categories, which could be subject to underreporting (Assault on private property, Robbery, Incursions on population), event categories that are more ambiguous (Other terrorist attacks), and events where there might be only (a few) military official witnesses and/or it might be embarrassing to report (Raids and Ambushes). As a result, we construct the "most visible" categorization to include only Explosive Attacks, Incendiary Attacks, Attacks Against Installations, and Illegal Roadblocks. These are highly visible events, which comprise only about one-third (4,302) of the total actions registered in the dataset for this time period. In comparison with the strict categorization, the "likely visible" set includes several additional kinds of actions that could possibly be concealed or misreported, but where there is reason to believe this is unlikely or rare given it would require the collaboration of multiple troops involved in the incident. This likely visible set additionally includes Political Attacks, Armed Contact with government troops, and Combat with government troops, for a total of 9,770 actions. Since these events are larger and more public, the resulting variables may also indicate the occurrence of more severe guerrilla activity in a given town. Even with the data reconstructed in these different ways, the total events index and "most visible" and "likely visible" indices are highly correlated (r=0.834). In additional robustness tests, displayed in Table 1 , we find that our results remain consistent and significant when both the most visible and likely visible counts of guerrilla actions are used as the dependent variable in regressions. The coefficients of the land reform variables are slightly higher when the "most visible" series is used.
In sum, an analysis of the more visible guerrilla actions that are less likely to suffer from misreporting biases yield results very similar to those in the manuscript. 
Conformity Between Colombian Government Data and Human Rights Data
To examine the quality of our data for the dependent variable of guerrilla activities in greater detail, we have also been able to obtain a good approximation of the true "reference population" of conflict events in Colombia.
Information from the Colombian government's National Census of Personerías conducted by the National Prosecutors (Procuraduría) office is available for 1993, around the mid-point of our data. Personerías are government employees that are present in every town. They are charged with monitoring the conflict conditions in their respective towns and carrying out the legal processes of recording and reporting cases of victimization. As independent human rights monitors, they have no formal interaction with the armed forces. According to Camilo Echandía, one of Colombia's foremost experts on the armed conflict, the data from the Presidency and Vicepresidency (OVP) "tends to coincide with the results of the National Census of Personerías from the last semester of 1993, where half of Colombian municipios registered guerrilla presence" (Echandía 1999). Similar to Echandía's finding, our data conforms closely with the independently collected Personerías reports when an indicator of guerrilla presence is constructed (proxying for guerrilla presence if at least one armed action is registered). According to our calculations, 51% of all municipios in Colombia had at least one recorded guerrilla action during the five year period from 1989-1993 leading up to the Personería census. If one examines the three year period from 1992 to 1994, 46% of towns had guerrilla presence (about an 8% undercount). Both of these estimates of aggregate guerrilla presence come quite close to the 50% mark estimated by the Personería census.
In sum, the Personería data suggest that the degree of bias in the reporting of guerrilla actions is likely low. But because there could possibly still be biases (e.g. if the Personería data should suffer some misreporting or if the government data deviate from the Personería data later in the period), we now focus on the nature and degree of potential bias that would be problematic for the manuscript's findings.
Reciprocity between Government and Guerrilla/Paramilitary Actions
We conducted further tests to examine a potential endogenous relationship between guerrilla actions and government actions given that guerrilla actions may lead to state repression and that state repression may spur behavioral challenges such as guerrilla action. Government actions may also have a reciprocal relationship with paramilitary actions. Most importantly for the results we present in the paper, land reform (plots reformed) is correlated with paramilitary and government actions at less than .02. If the coefficients on paramilitary or government actions are therefore somewhat suppressed or increased after accounting for reciprocity with guerrilla activity, this will not affect the estimated coefficient of land reform. Of course, not accounting for the reciprocal relationship could still bias the estimated coefficients on Paramilitary and Government Attacks. In a basic OLS model with controls, Guerrilla actions predict paramilitary actions (.025, p<.001) and government actions (.123, p<.001). When instrumenting for guerrilla actions as in Table 5 of the paper using La Violencia and a count of ANUC land invasions, the predicted coefficients for paramilitary actions (.032, p=.006) and government actions (.180, p=.002) are larger. The one-way causal effect (i.e. stripped of reciprocal causation) of guerrilla actions on government and paramilitary actions is greater than the unadjusted effect. This is most likely because guerrilla actions result in a response by the government and paramilitaries in the form of more actions, which may suppress guerrilla actions over the longer term.
Accounting for the reciprocal relationship would somewhat depress the estimated coefficients of paramilitary and government attacks, although they should retain the same sign. Since that is effectively similar to an omitted variable bias of "reciprocal conflict" that has a negative sign, and because paramilitary actions are positively correlated with plots reformed and government actions negatively correlated with plots reformed, accounting for reciprocal conflict with these variables would lead to different directions of bias on the plots reformed variable. However, since the correlation between plots reformed and the paramilitary and government actions variables is so close to 0, the net effect of including the reciprocal relationship between guerrillas and paramilitaries/government forces for the plots reformed coefficient should be negligible. Furthermore, because paramilitary and government actions are slightly positively correlated with prior plots, our estimated coefficient on prior plots should be biased downward (against our hypothesis).
Addressing Reporting Biases

Overlap Analysis
In the absence of a full multiple-recapture analysis, we conduct a series of overlap analyses in an effort to gain a better understanding of potential reporting biases.
Correlating Colombian Government (OVP) Data and CINEP Data
To compare the Government (OVP) and CINEP data series, we first conduct a bivariate regression that includes department and year fixed effects to account for possible noise and differences in reporting and coverage between these sources across time and space (and as included in our full specifications of the effect of land reform). The model (Table 2) indicates a reasonably large and statistically significant correlation between the two datasets. The CINEP data generally report fewer guerrilla actions than OVP. To help provide a more detailed sense of where the OVP and CINEP datasets converge and where they differ we conducted several additional sets of disaggregated correlations. We first ran correlations between the OVP and CINEP municipality-year guerrilla actions data by department (Colombia has 30 departments, excluding Bogotá and the San Andrés islands). The correlations across departments range from -.02 to .81, and are smallest in small, peripheral, sparsely populated departments -areas where CINEP has poor press coverage. The distant, minimally populated departments of Amazonas and Vaupés have no coverage at all in CINEP's dataset. By contrast, the correlations are higher in moderate to highly conflictive areas, moderate sized departments, and where there is newspaper coverage, such as in the departments of Norte de Santander, Santander, Huila, and Cauca. Yet even in a few large, central departments, such as Antioquia (with over one-tenth of the municipios in the country), correlations are found to be more attenuated, perhaps because they have too many events and too much terrain for the press to provide as good coverage. Comparing correlations by whether the departments have newspaper reporting is telling: in departments where CINEP has at least one newspaper source, the average correlation between datasets (weighted by municipality-year observations) is approximately twice as large as the average correlation in departments with no press source. This speaks to the importance of including department (and in some cases municipality) fixed effects in our regression models.
We also analyzed how the correlation between the two datasets changes over time. Figure 3 shows the coefficients from a series of regressions using CINEP guerrilla actions to predict OVP actions (adjusting for department-level differences using department fixed effects given the discussion above). The coefficients are larger in the early and later periods of the sample, with lower correlations in the mid-1990s. The number of guerrilla actions by year (lower line) is also displayed in the graph (1000s of attacks), which highlights that the time-trend of the relationship between CINEP and OVP data tracks closely with the change in guerrilla actions. This is likely because in more conflictive yearssuch as the years in the early and late 1990s -the press does a better job of covering events. To deal with these possible differences in reporting across time, all of our regression models in the manuscript contain year fixed effects. This section tests more formally whether the OVP and CINEP data are capturing the same underlying dimension of guerrilla attacks. To do so, we conduct a factor analysis to investigate whether variations in these two variables reflect the variations in a single unobserved latent variable.
The results are found in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The negative eigenvalue for the second factor in Table  3 .1 indicates that the dimensionality of the factor space is only one. Only one factor is retained. The factor loadings in Table 3 .2 indicate how the OVP and CINEP guerrilla action variables are weighted for the retained factor as well as the correlation between these variables and the factor. The uniqueness column indicates the proportion of the common variance of each variable not associated with the factor. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that the OVP and CINEP data are indeed measuring the same underlying concept of guerrilla actions. This provides more formal justification for using CINEP as an alternative to OVP to measure guerrilla actions. 
Histograms of Government and CINEP Data Overlap
Two histograms below provide a visualization of the distribution of overlap in reported guerrilla actions by the government and CINEP. The degree of overlap is calculated at the municipal-year level as the difference between the number of events in the government and CINEP datasets (positive values indicate more recorded government actions than recorded CINEP actions). Given the absence of case-level events data, perfect overlap as defined here indicates equal counts of guerrilla actions in both datasets. The available data cannot adjudicate as to whether the reported cases themselves are the same.
In terms of raw numbers, overlap is high: a total of 74% of municipality-years have perfect overlap, where both sources report the same number of guerrilla actions. A full 88% of municipalityyears differ by at most one guerrilla action, 93% by at most two guerrilla actions, and 96% differ by three or fewer actions.
The first histogram in Figure 4 shows this high degree of overlap for all municipality-year observations. The large number of observations with zero difference in guerrilla actions between these datasets indicates that the majority of observations completely overlap. This is in part because guerrilla actions are relatively rare and only occur in certain parts of the country, and therefore the majority of observations in both datasets record zero guerrilla actions. The relatively greater number of observations with positive differences in reporting between datasets shows that event reporting in the government data is greater than the reporting by CINEP. This is likely because CINEP is based on press coverage.
The second histogram in Figure 4 displays the overlap only for those municipality-years where some non-zero number of events were reported in each dataset. Even restricting to this subset of municipality-years, the majority of observations differ by one guerrilla action or less between datasets.
Cases of High and Low Overlap Between Government and CINEP Data
While the above sections indicate that there is significant overlap between the OVP and CINEP data, they do not provide a sense of the municipality-years where these data sources diverge most. This section takes a closer look at the departments and municipalities where overlap is particularly high and low to shed greater light on differences between reported guerrilla action between the two datasets. Figure 5 displays the variation in overlap at a broader level by Colombia's 32 departments. In this table, perfect overlap corresponds to zero difference between government and CINEP reporting. Positive values indicate relatively greater government data coverage. Mean annual overlap rates are generally high at the department level, although there are three departments where it is somewhat lower: Guaviare, Bogotá, and Arauca.
Figures 6 and 7 provide a more detailed picture of the overlap between the datasets by listing the municipalities with the least amount of overlap as indicated by the mean difference between Government and CINEP datasets from 1990-2000. Figure 6 shows the top 20 municipalities where CINEP relatively over-reports events and Figure 7 shows the top 20 municipalities where Government data relatively over-reports. These outlier cases are consistent with the municipality-year histogram of overlap between datasets which indicates that most cases do not suffer from poor overlap. Figure 7 suggests first that the government may relatively over-report events in areas that have traditionally been guerrilla strongholds such as in the municipalities of San Vicente de Chucurí (ELN) and San José del Guaviare (FARC) -places where press sources may have more restricted access. In the regression tests, this discrepancy would be accounted for by municipality fixed-effects, the historical indicator of guerrilla actions from 1985, and the indicator for the La Violencia conflict of the 1950s. Second, the government may relatively over-report events in large metropolitan areas such as Medellín, Bogotá, Bucaramanga, and Cali. The reporting in these urban areas should not have great influence on our results since they are unlikely to be areas where land reform is prevalent and interacting with processes of insurgency. They would also be accounted for in the regression through municipality fixed-effects and variables for population and distance to department capitals. The municipalities in Figure 6 of CINEP over-reporting do not immediately indicate a clear pattern although some cases such as Turbo and Necoclí are known for having active Diocese.
Even within this set of areas with poor overlap between datasets we are able to find some indication of support for our hypotheses from a closer examination of the cases. An additional and noteworthy pattern from Figures 5 and 7 is that the department of Arauca and several of its municipalities exhibit extreme levels of government over-reporting of guerrilla actions. We briefly study some of these municipalities from Arauca as qualitative cases at the end of the article with Figure 6 : Top 20 Municipalities with Greatest Over-reporting in CINEP Data Relative to Government the expectation that they would experience differing effects of land reform since they are similar neighboring cases and received similar levels of significant land reform in the period prior to 1988 but then diverged in their levels of reform in the current period from 1988-2000. The qualitative analysis helps provide a more in-depth assessment of our hypotheses and provides confirmation that even in these cases with lower overlap between data sources, the relative differences in land reform are correlated with differences in insurgent activity. In the regression analysis, poor overlap is implicitly accounted for both with department fixed effects as well as in the difference-in-difference models at the municipal level.
Overlap Analysis: Where the Government and CINEP Data Diverge
This section performs a more formal overlap analysis, broadly examining in a regression framework the municipality-years where these data sources diverge most, and what effects this might have on the results. We use the land reform variables and covariates to predict differences in the reported number of guerrilla actions in the OVP and CINEP data at the municipality-year. The models focus on municipality-years in which one of these sources reported any non-zero amount of guerrilla activity. A substantial number of municipalities (20%) never experienced guerrilla activity during the period, and others only experienced activity for a small part of the period. Because most of these areas were beyond the reach of the conflict, and are coded as such by OVP, CINEP, and the National Census of Personerías, they are unlikely to be subject to reporting bias and are dropped Table 4 displays the results of the overlap analysis. Model 1 is specified similarly to the main model in Column 3 of manuscript Table 2 , but excludes paramilitary and government attacks. Model 2 includes these variables. The first point to note is that the difference in the OVP and CINEP data are not statistically significantly correlated with the land reform variables. This implies that any biases in the differences between the sources would not affect the coefficients of the land reform variables or the inferences that we draw. Poverty and government attacks, however, are significant predictors of the differences between data sources at the .05 level. Differences in reporting are greater in areas where poverty is lower and government attacks are higher. The result on poverty may be related to CINEP's more complete network of local church officials in rural areas where poverty is higher. More government attacks predicts greater differences in reporting. This may be because the government has better access to information in these conflict zones than outside sources, or because they provide a relatively more complete count of guerrilla activities in these areas. Table 5 examines how land reform affects guerrilla actions in areas where OVP and CINEP data are more likely and less likely to overlap. This table supplements the robustness tests conducted for the first revision that split the data based on ruralness, state presence, and the distance of a municipality from its department capital. The Table 5 models are specified similarly to Model 3 of  Table 2 , and the analysis is split by level of poverty and guerrilla attacks. Models 1 and 2 indicate that both current Plots reformed and Prior plots are positively and statistically significantly linked to guerrilla actions in both high poverty and low poverty regions when split by the mean level of poverty. Models 3-6 split the data using two different thresholds for government attacks. Models 3-4 split the data by whether a given municipality-year experienced any government attacks or not. Models 5-6 split the data by whether a given municipality experienced any government attacks during the entire period 1988-2000 or not. Prior plots is positive and statistically significant across Models 3-6. Plots reformed is positive and significant in Model 4 among municipality-years that experienced no government attacks. It is insignificant in Model 3, although the size of the sample is substantially reduced. Plots reformed regains its positive sign and significance in Model 5 among municipalities that experienced some goverment attacks in the period. It is positive but insignificant in Model 6. While these analyses highlight some similarities across the two guerrilla action datasets and the Personería data from Section 2.3 provides some confirmation that the OVP data may well approximate the "true" number of attacks, there could still be a threat to inference if both the OVP and CINEP data are biased in the same direction. As a result, we conduct a series of analyses that address the nature and degree of bias that would be problematic for the inferences we draw in the paper.
Nature of Bias: At What Level Must Bias Exist to Change the Results?
What is the nature of bias that must exist in the data on guerrilla attacks for it to be problematic for our results? The main models in the paper include department fixed effects and year dummies, and taking into account similar results using CINEP data, any problematic remaining biases in the data must be non-uniform municipality-specific biases that are shared by both government and nongovernment data and that are in some way correlated with land reform and guerrilla activity. That the biases must be correlated with land reform is important given that "classical" measurement error (i.e. random error that is uncorrelated with the error term) leads to attenuation bias (see e.g. Imai and Yamamoto 2010), leading to an underestimate of the true effect of land reform on guerrilla activity.
Here we subject our results to an even stricter specification than using department and year fixed effects to see if our results remain and to gain a more precise sense of the kind of remaining bias that would have to exist to destabilize our results. More specifically, we re-estimate the main results from Model 3 of manuscript Table 2 and Model 4 of Table 5 using department*year fixed effects, and using municipality-year difference-in-difference models using department*year fixed effects. The results are displayed in Tables 6 and 7. They are substantively and statistically similar to the results in the manuscript.
Models Using Department*Year Fixed Effects
As a result of including an interaction between geographic-and time-specific fixed effects, Table  6 indicates that any bias in the data on guerrilla activities must be municipal-level time-varying biases that deviate from department-level yearly trends and are also correlated with municipal-level land reform for it to be problematic for the results we draw in our empirical analyses. Furthermore, similar empirical results using municipal fixed effects models (as noted in the manuscript) mitigate concerns of bias across municipalities. The type of bias that could be problematic for the finding of a positive effect of current and prior land titling on guerrilla actions is therefore quite restrictive: municipality-year biases across both government and CINEP sources that result in consistent overreporting where land reform is high (or under-reporting where land reform is low) on a yearly-varying basis within a given municipality. The only way to truly address this possibility would be to run a model with municipality*year fixed effects, which would themselves perfectly predict the data and make it impossible to measure the effect of any covariates, including land reform, on guerrilla activity. 
Municipal Difference-in-Difference Models Using Department*Year Fixed Effects
Estimating difference-in-difference models at the municipal level provides an even stricter bound on potentially problematic bias than that discussed above in Section 3.2.1. Municipal differencein-difference models address the possibility of unobservable heterogeneity in reporting patterns (or other unobservable factors that may introduce bias) at the municipal level. We therefore conducted a series of these models on municipality-years, including department-year fixed effects as in Table  6 . These are quite stringent empirical tests given that the length of the time-series (13 years) is relatively short and much smaller than the cross-section. This approach drops information contained in cross-municipality level differences, and makes it more difficult to estimate the effects of slowly changing variables such as poverty, population density, tenancy, and to some extent the prior plots variable. Because the variables for coca, colonization zones, altitude, and minority presence are not time-varying, they are dropped from the estimation. Table 7 displays the results of these models, which capture how yearly changes in municipallevel land titling (and other independent variables) affect yearly changes in municipal-level guerrilla actions that deviate from department-year specific trends. The main results remain robust to this strict specification. Current and prior land titling has a positive effect on guerrilla actions, although the latter loses significance (p<0.30) in Model 2, which includes the land reform interaction terms. Model 2 indicates that there is a negative marginal effect of current reform when a certain threshold in prior reform has been reached, consistent with the main findings presented in the paper. Table 7 provides an even more restrictive condition than Table 6 on the type of bias that would be problematic for the finding of a positive effect of current and prior land titling on guerrilla action: municipal-level yearly-varying biases that deviate from department-level yearly trends and are also correlated with yearly changes in municipal-level land reform. Furthermore, we know the direction of bias that would have to exist to be problematic: consistent increases in over-reporting on a yearlyvarying basis within a given municipality where yearly changes in land reform are positive and large (or more under-reporting where yearly changes in land reform are negative). 3.3 Sensitivity Analyses: How Much Bias is Necessary to Undermine the Results?
Sensitivity Analyses Based on Overlap Between OVP and CINEP Data
The first sensitivity analysis we conduct is based on an overlap analysis of the OVP and CINEP datasets. Rather than predict the determinants of the differences between these data as in Table 4 above, we examine how sensitive the results are to removing observations where these data sources report the most divergence. We estimate a series of regression models where the samples of each successive model are increasingly restricted to only those observations with high levels of overlap between the two datasets. We compare the main results from Model 3 of manuscript Table 2 with successive models that only include observations where the difference in reported guerrilla actions between OVP and CINEP is less than 10 (including a number of observations with low overlap), less than 9, etc., down to only less than 2 (including only observations with high overlap) in a given municipality-year. * The results of these tests are summarized in Figure 8 . This figure shows the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effects of our land reform variables (Current Plots and Prior Plots) in the successive regression models. As the observations are increasingly resticted to those with greatest overlap, the estimated coefficients of the land reform variables shown in Figure 8 decrease. Only the lower 95% confidence interval for Current Plots crosses zero when using the most restrictive overlap criteria, but even then the coefficient remains statistically significant at the 90% level. In none of the remaining models-not even in the tests using the samples with the most restrictive overlap criteria-does the lower confidence interval cross zero.
In sum, our principal results are robust to excluding the observations that could most be subject to misreporting based on poor overlap between the OVP and CINEP datasets.
Regression Calibration Estimating Reporting Bias
The second set of sensitivity analyses more directly addresses the possibility of an omitted variable ("Reporting Bias") that predicts bias in the reporting of guerrilla activities. This variable could capture incentives to misreport or sources of incompleteness that may result in biases in the dependent variable of guerrilla attacks. We introduce proxies for these incentives or tendencies to misreport that reasonably suffer from measurement error and then use regression calibration (see e.g. Carroll et al. 1995 , Hardin et al. 2003 and simulation extrapolation (see e.g. Cook and Stefanski 1990) to estimate the resulting measurement error models. The first stage of these methods results in a calibration function for estimating the unobserved covariate of "Reporting Bias." This unobserved covariate is then replaced by its predicted values from the calibration model. Finally, the standard errors are adjusted to account for the estimation of the unobserved covariate.
We use two different approaches to estimate the unobserved covariate of Reporting Bias. First, we use a variable called Delinquency from the OVP dataset, which is a count of actions committed by common criminals and self-defense groups. These are unaffiliated groups and gangs, some of which later formed paramilitary groups. To the extent that local military officers had incentives to underreport guerrilla actions, it is conceivable that they could have reported guerrilla actions or actions that were ambiguously attributable to delinquent group actions. Conversely, they could have reported delinquent group actions as guerrilla actions in places where there were incentives or tendencies to overreport. As a result, Delinquency should lead to lower predicted guerrilla actions. Second, we use both Delinquency and Homicides to predict reporting bias. Homicide data are taken * The models did not reach convergence when restricting to perfectly matching observations; however, the majority of these were the municipality-years that registered no guerrilla activity. Note: The figure plots the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for Current Plots and Prior Plots from a series of regression models specified as in Model 3 of Table 2 but with varying data samples. The data sample for each model is restricted to municipality-years where the difference in OVP and CINEP reported guerrilla activities is less than the values listed on the x-axis. from the National Police and include all homicides -by criminals, domestic killings, and armed groups.
The results of a series of regression calibration models are found in Table 8 . The models are specified as in Models 2 and 3 of Table 2 , and include regional fixed effects and year dummies. † Because Models 1 and 2 only use one replicate measurement (Delinquency) to measure Reporting Bias, we must assume a measurement error variance. We choose a measurement error variance of 2, which is sizeable relative to the variance of 7.5 in guerrilla actions. Given that guerrilla actions spans a large range of activity with a sizeable number of municipality-years experiencing no activity and a significant portion with high guerrilla activity, and given similar results using the most "visible" events (see Section 2.2) and CINEP data, we should expect the measurement error variance to be considerably less than the variance in guerrilla activity. ‡ When the estimated "Reporting Bias" variable is included in the model, it is negative and statistically significant, but does not strongly impact the estimated effect of the other covariates. The land reform variables Plots reformed and Prior plots remain positive and statistically significantly linked to greater guerrilla actions after introducing Reporting Bias, and their substantive effect is similar to that in Table 2 of the manuscript. The coefficients of the other covariates are generally similar in size and statistical significance to those reported in manuscript Table 2 . Models 3 and 4 introduce two replicate measurements for Reporting Bias in the form of Delinquency and Homicides. As a result, the assumption of known measurement error variance on Reporting Bias can be relaxed and is now estimated from the replicates. The results are similar to those in Models 1 and 2.
We next estimate Model 1 of Table 8 using simulation extrapolation (SIMEX) to obtain a graph that shows how the amount of measurement error affects the estimated coefficients. Figure 9 shows the estimated coefficients for the Plots Reformed and Prior Plots variables based on the Model 1 specification in Table 8 . As detailed above, Model 1 includes a measure of reporting bias that is measured with error. The graph illustrates the extrapolated point estimates for the land reform variables in the fitted model, as well as how these estimates vary according to the variance in the measurement error of Reporting Bias. A Lamba of -1 corresponds to the case of no measurement error. The key point is that land reform variables remain positive and significant across the range of measurement error in Reporting Bias. Furthermore, the sizes of these coefficients are relatively stable. The estimated coefficients of the land reform variables from the simulation extrapolation are only slightly lower than the naive estimates that do not account for potential reporting bias. Table 8 , as well as how these estimates vary according to the variance in the measurement error of Reporting Bias. A quadratic extrapolant function is used. Measurement error in Reporting Bias is increasing in Lamda.
Supplementary Robustness Tests
This section provides a discussion and presents the results of a series of additional robustness tests relevant to the manuscript, most of which are cited but not reported in the manuscript due to space considerations. A brief description of each robustness table is given here along with the findings. Table 9 : This table uses municipal-level data on homicide rates from the National Police for the period 1990-2000 to empirically test whether the effect of land reform was different for civilian violence than for guerrilla actions. Importantly, we find that the estimated effect of land reform on homicide rates differs from its effect on guerrilla activity, suggesting that the indicator for guerrilla activity used in the manuscript is not simply a proxy for violence more generally. 10: Given potential concerns of misreporting bias or manipulation of armed group action data by the Colombian military, we use municipal-level data on guerrilla activities, paramilitary activities, and government actions that was gathered independently by the Jesuit think tank Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP). This organization codes their data in the same way as the government, making their data comparable with the government data. Furthermore, given that CINEP has different incentives from the government, and an extensive network of local sources even in rural areas, biases in the military and CINEP data sources are likely to differ. Substituting the CINEP data for the government data in the Table 10 models yields similar results to those found in the manuscript using the Colombian military's data. presents a series of random effects negative binomial and tobit models to estimate the effect of land reform on guerrilla actions. The results are similar to the negative binomial and tobit models with department fixed effects that are presented in the manuscript. Table 2 in the manuscript, but with an alternative definition of offensive government actions. We limit government actions to those that are plausibly more offensive in nature (capture of armaments, rescue or freeing of kidnap victims, anti-narcotic operations, and raids). The results are similar to the negative binomial and tobit models with department fixed effects that are presented in the manuscript. Table 13 : This table examines whether minority presence in an area influences how land titling impacts guerrilla activity. The first two models indicate that the coefficients on the land reform variables are robust to dropping those municipalities that have 50% or more minorities. Models 3 and 4 include an interaction between land reform and ethnic minority variables. This interaction is not significant and the results for the effects of land reform on insurgent activity are stable. This suggests that the effects of land reform on insurgency (according to our data which consists of titles to individuals and not collective territories such as resguardos) are consistent regardless of variations in levels of demand for reform that depend on the composition of the population in certain municipios. In other words, they are not conditional on the size of the ethnic minority population in a municipio. However, in some tobit models the interaction term coefficient is significant and negative (and the main results on the effects of land reform hold). This would be expected according to our theory of the importance of the ratio of beneficiaries to non-beneficiaries since municipios with greater minority populations would exhibit relatively less demand for traditional forms of individual land titling. Given a constant level of supply of land reform across these areas and non-minority areas, the overall number of (non-minority) titling beneficiaries should be proportionally higher and should thus more likely demonstrate a negative effect of tilting on insurgency in these areas. This result would be consistent with the threshold effect we find in our main set of interaction tests between the current plots reformed and prior plots reformed variables. Table 14 : This table estimates a series of Heckman two-stage selection models in order to first predict land reform and then its impact on guerrilla actions. The first stage model includes variables for the land area of a municipality as well as the percentage of overused land according to the Colombian geography agency (IGAC) as instruments to predict selection into land reform treatment. These regressors are excluded in the second stage outcome equations. Model 1 shows the determinants of receiving any land reform at all, whereas Models 2-4 show a series of second-stage models that predict the number of guerrilla actions. The results are similar to those in the manuscript. presence in the basic negative binomial models presented in the manuscript. The first is a measure of bureaucratic strength in the form of government officials per capita. The second is a measure of police stations (in the town center, measured in 1995). Whereas the measure of government officials is statistically insignificant, police stations are positive and statistically significant, likely because police stations are either placed in areas that have a greater propensity for guerrilla activity, or because these stations become targets for guerrillas. The results for the land reform variables are similar to those in the manuscript. 
Additional Case Study Evidence from Araucan Towns
This section expands upon the discussion of the case municipalities discussed in the manuscript, providing further background on land reform and guerrilla activity from the municipalities in Arauca.
From the 1960s through the 1980s there was a strong relationship between Araucan peasants and INCORA (Carroll 2011) . Although there was uniformly large ("prior") land reform during this era across the case municipios, their histories from the subsequent period exhibit greater divergence. In 1964, INCORA began the Arauca Project 1, which would come to title a total of 200,000 hectares. Colonists promptly arrived and were given land titles. INCORA's efforts reflected integral and intensive development: the institution assisted economic development and helped provide additional public goods, such as paved roads to help transport agricultural products and inputs to help make the land productive and the communities prosper. As one resident of Saravena recalled, "The Institute was very concerned about us. They would visit even the most far-flung villages... This is a big region, but whichever part you venture to, anyone will tell you, 'This was made by INCORA.' Bridges, schools, hospitals, airports. Saravena was practically built by INCORA.' It helped us organize as a community and in cooperative labor to keep up the plots" (INCORA 2002) . Carroll confirms the intensiveness of INCORA activity, noting that "the piedmont settlers'... [of Saravena, Tame, and Arauquita] interests were largely ignored by the dominant plains politicians... Instead, they derived benefits directly from INCORA" (Carroll 2011, 183) . In later years, from the 1970s and continuing into the early 1990s, ANUC-supported protests successfully demanded additional responses from INCORA in the form of titling and credit. As Carroll (2011, 183) writes, "The first major mobilization, a civil strike in 1972, concentrated five thousand protesters in Saravena and succeed in not only bringing national authorities to the negotiating table but also in reactivating INCORA's loan and expenditure programs."
The beginnings of land reform in Arauca were auspicious, but evidence from the latter period of the 1980s and 1990s shows that titling was better sustained in some parts of the department, such as Tame, than others. Sometimes, for random reasons, there were opportunities to easily title land, such as the death of a large landowner. This happened in a case in Tame when Julio Delgado died in 1997 (El Tiempo 1999) . His latifundio of 103,000 hectares of highly productive land underwent an extinction of domain in 1999 and was repartitioned to some 350 peasant families, some of whom had previously invaded the area as early as 25 years prior. § In other parts of the Department of Arauca -beyond Tame where the latifundio was successfully divided -INCORA was apparently less efficient and effective at titling land for bureaucratic reasons (Rojas Sánchez 1994). Policy flexibility for additional reforms such as increasing funding for local INCORA offices was impeded by centralized control by the national government and political incentives to not concede to insurgent demands (Carroll 2011, 222) . In one instance, when national politicians balked at meeting ANUC protesters' demands to bolster INCORA's Arauca office with additional resources, the departmental governor was able to overcome the bureaucratic impediments by contributing revenues from oil proceeds (Carroll 2011, 221-22) . However, as a 1992 report shows, these kinds of contributions to supplement land titling were apparently not sustained. The Araucan departmental manger of INCORA could not get sufficient attention and response from the national government office to complete titling for the Sarare subregion of Saravena, one of the case municip- § As we control for in our models with variables for paramilitary attacks, the hacendado effect was present in areas of Arauca where large landholders acted to defend their properties, "[In the plains]... holdings tend to be very large...and their owners are wealthy and powerful, but frequently without formal and universally recognized land titles. Instead, the large cattle rancher would have a right of possession. The legal precariousness of the right to possession probably contributed to the vehemence with which the wealthiest ranchers later reacted to the emergence of the peasant settler-based Left" (Carroll, 2011, 180-181) .
ios which suffered high levels of guerrilla actions (El Tiempo 1992) . Even though this manager was viewed as an "honest" official and had completed some public works projects in Saravena, ANUC and other peasant organizations were left unsatisfied and placed the blame on him for the failure to get the national government to address their needs.
In sum, while Tame benefitted from more sustained episodes of land titling during the 1990s, a review of the archives of the national newspaper El Tiempo reveals fewer reports of similar INCORA activity in the 1990s in other Araucan towns, such as Saravena.
